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PARTNERSIDPS-LIMITED-FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTES
AS BASIS FOR UNLIMITED LIABILITY-The recent decision of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kistler v. Gingles,1 that a limited partner
under the Arkansas Limited Partnership Act fails to avoid unlimited
liability if the terms of the statute are not complied with, illustrates the
inherent danger of the limited partnership. This statute,2 which is
typical of the limited partnership statutes3 antedating the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act,4 provides, in part, for an affidavit by one of the
general partners stating that the sums which each limited partner proposes to contribute to the enterprise have actually and in good faith
been paid into the business in cash by the date of its registration;5
and that if any false statement be made in the affidavit, all the persons
interested in such partnership shall be liable for all the engagements
of the £rm as general partners. 6 The uncontested facts in the above
case show that while the would-be limited partners had not actually
paid over in cash their full contributions as had been stated in the
affidavit, they were at all times ready, willing, and able to so do. Instead
of losing only their initial investment in the enterprise, the investors
were held liable for the concern's entire indebtedness as a result of
their failure to follow the precise terms of the statute. Herein lies
the danger of the limited partnership and the reason this type of business association has been largely neglected in those states not adopting
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 7
The purpose of the limited partnership is well stated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut: 8 " ••• [In the limited partnership] we
find a clear general purpose and intent by the legislature to encourage
trade by authorizing and permitting a capitalist to put his money into
a partnership with general partners possessed of skill and business
Cir., 1949) 171 F. (2d) 912.
Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§10558-10585.
3 See BATES, I.Aw OF UllflTED PARTNERSHIP 21 et seq. (1886) for a comparison of the
various state statutes.
4 See 8 U.L.A., Partnership, §6 (1948) for list of states, 28 in number, which have
adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
r; Sec. 10565.
6 Sec. 10566.
7 Lewis, "The Uniform Limited Partnership Act," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 715 (1917),
discusses the defects in existing limited partnership acts causing the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to adopt the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
s Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463 at 466 (1868).
'
1 (8th
2 Ark.
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character only, without becoming a general partner or hazarding anything in the business except the capital originally subscribed." The
traditional common law partnership association could not be used as
such an investment device because of the early doctrine of partnership
liability to third persons of anyone who shared the profits of a trade,
focluding lenders of capital who received a share of its profits in place
of interest. 9 Although the capitalist can realize his goal of limited
liability through investment in a corporation, as a limited partner he
has an advantage over the stockholder in a corporation in that he may
be sure of the active interest of the general partners, whose functions
are similar to those of the directors of a corporation, because such
partners, unlike the directors of a corporation, are unlimitedly liable
for the partnership's debts. On the other hand, the limited partner has
no voice in the management of his capital such as a corporate stockholder has. The advantages of the limited partnership are considerable,
and were so recognized by the legislatures as far back as 1822 when
New York passed the first limited partnership act.10 This statute was
soon duplicated by other states and by 1888 was in effect in all but
three states, closely copied by all, almost verbatim by many.11 When
these statutes were drafted and the limited partnerships formed under
them were first subjected to judicial cognizance, the old notion prevailed that one who partook of profits must run the risk of losses. The
limited partnership was accordingly considered by the courts as a
privilege granted by the legislature to the profit-seeking investor. Therefore, to achieve that privilege, he must meticulously meet the conditions attached to it as set forth in the act.12 Failure to comply defeated
the privilege and the investor was deemed a common law general
partner. Another argument:1 3 advanced for requiring the strictest adherence to the statute was that it was in derogation of the common
law and should be exactly construed. Thus, where the investment
in an enterprise was made in the form of bonds ( worth more than
9 Grace v. Smith, 2 W. Bl. 998 (1775); Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (1793). Cox
v. Hickman, 8 H.L. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860) overruled these cases.
10 N.Y. Laws (1822) p. 259.
11 BATES, LAw oF LIMITED PAR'l'NERSlilP 21 et seq. (1886).
12 Holliday v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 3 Colo. 342 (1887); Pierce v. Bryant, 87
Mass. 91 (1862); Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249 (1880); Henkel v. Heyman, 91 ill. 96
(1878).
13 For criticism of this rule see 36 HARv. L. REv. 1016 (1923).
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the subscription called for) instead of in cash as required by statute,
the subscriber was declared unlimitedly liable for the concern's debts.14
Again, where payment was made by check instead of in cash as required, the limited partner found himself unlimitedly liable.15 Where
the investments of the limited partners were recorded jointly, instead
of individually, the contributors were held to be liable generally since
the statute required each listing to be separated.16 Consequently,
while the policy behind the creation of limited partnerships was to
further investment by reducing risk, the attitude of the courts in
interpreting the statutes has been to deprive the provisions of any
usefulness, except where the association is to contain no more than
one limited partner.17
To revitalize the limited partnership, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners in 1916. The fundamental philosophy behind the Uniform
Act is that no public policy requires a person who contributes capital
to a business enterprise to become bound for the obligations of the
business.18 In furthering this policy, section 2 states: "A limited
partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance19 in
good faith with the requirements for formation." Section 11 gives
additional protection, stating that "a person who has contributed to
the capital of a business conducted by a person or partnership erroneously believing that he has become a limited partner in a limited
partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited
partner, a general partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the business, or bound by the obligations of such person or
partnership; provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly
renounces his interest in the profits of the business, or other compensation by way of income." Thus, limited liability is not under this act
a privilege attaching to the investor only by strict adherence to the
statutory scheme. Even if the intended limited partnership is not
14 Haggerty

and Albinola v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17 (1869).
re Allen's Estate, 41 Minn. 430, 43 N.W. 382 (1889).
16 Spencer Optical Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 53 S.C. 533, 31 S.E. 392 (1898).
17 Commissioners' Note, 8 U.L.A. 3.
1s Ibid.
19 The problem of what constitutes substantial compliance remains. The courts have
met this question many times in deciding whether a corporation de facto has been formed. The
same analysis applies here.
15 In
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formed because of failure to comply with the regulations set out in
the act, unlimited liability does not attach to the profit-seeking investor
in the twenty-eight states which have adopted the act, provided he
originally acted in good faith in attempting to abide by the requirements, and, on learning he has failed to meet them, promptly disavows
his interest in the association.
·
Since a substantial number of states continue to carry on their
books statutes resembling the New York Act of 1822, many investors
still run the risks of noncompliance with these older statutes, should
they choose to use them to achieve the desired goal of limited liability.
There is, however, another altefI!ative, indicated by the wide-spread
adoption of the principle laid down in Cox v. Hickman, 20 that while
profit sharing is a prima facie indicium of partnership it is not conclusive, and one may receive a share of profits, as payment of a debt, or
in lieu of interest, without becoming a partner in fact or liable as a
partner to third party creditors. This case is a milestone in the history
of partnership law, repudiating the concept that the profit sharer in a
business is a partner on whom unlimited liability falls. Under this
rule, which has been codified in section 7(4) of the Uniform Partnership Act (to be distinguished from the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act), one may invest money in return for a share of the profits of an
unincorporated enterprise without complying with the statutory steps
prescribed in the limited partnership acts, provided he does not participate in the concern's management. Consequently, a person desiring
to invest capital in an enterprise in the expectancy of receiving in
return a share of its profits is strongly advised to avoid the limited
partnership acts in those states which have not as yet adopted the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Instead he should carefully preserve evidence indicating the fact that he contributed money to the
partnership merely for investment purposes without the intention of
joining it as a general partner.
But what of the investor who has attempted without success to
comply with the older limited partnership statutes? Is the burden of
unlimited liability to be placed upon him even though he has conscientiously and in good faith tried to abide by their terms? Certainly
the wording of the statutes leaves little hope for nonliability. 21 Never20 8

H.L. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
LAw oF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 38 (1886).

21 BATES,
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theless, the Supreme Court of the United States in Giles 11. Vetter2 2
relieved such an investor of unlimited liability. In this case the parties
intended to create among themselves the relationship of limited partners for the purpose of running a stock brokerage office under the
Illinois Limited Partnership Act of 1874, but they failed to do so
because this act had been replaced by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act the day before they filed their papers. The Uniform Act did
not allow limited partnerships in this type of business, thereby removing the possibility that the investors could protect themselves from
unlimited liability under it. Moreover, the partnership agreement was
not in the form nor filed at the office required by the Uniform Act.
When the firm accrued debts, the creditors brought suit, seeking to
place the unlimited liability of general partners upon the investors.
The Court held not only that the investors were not partners but also
that they were not liable as partners, relying on section 7 ( 4) of the
Uniform Partnership Act which contains, as said, the codified form
of the concepts laid down in Cox 11. Hickman. Inasmuch as the partners did in fact attempt to abide by the terms of the older limited
partnership act, this case is authority for the nonliability of one who
enters into an intended limited partnership as a limited partner under
the older type limited partnership statute. The court's decision was
based upon the Uniform Partnership Act without reference to either
the repealed limited partnership act nor its successor, and since the
Uniform Partnership Act, section 7(4), is declaratory of the common
law, the case is also authority for nonliability in those states which
have not enacted it.23 A wide acceptance of the rule applied in this
case would eliminate the dangers inherent in the older statutes, placing
an investor in a state which has not adopted the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act in the same liability-free position as one in a state
in which that act is now the law. Thus by indirect means the policy
which originally led the legislatures to pass limited partnership acts
could be put to full nationwide practice.

Fred W. Freeman, S. Ed.
263 U.S. 553, 44 S.Ct. 157 (1924).
7 U.L.A., Partnership, xv (1949) for a list of states which have adopted the
Uniform Partnership Act.
22

23 See

